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The Organization for National Security

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CRITICS of the National Security Act of 1947 have generally failed to observe a sense of proportion. Attention has been focused on the misnamed "70-group" Air Force question, the continuing questions regarding roles and missions of the three services, and the apparent duplications between the military departments in facilities and services. This focus has obscured some of the great gains made in hammering out an organization for national security which in the long view may well prove the most significant activity of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in its initial year. The task of changing the organization skeleton provided by the act into a team of men associated in the common purposes of developing a strong coordinated policy for national security has been carried out quietly while the inter-service differences made the headlines. It is the purpose of this article to review the organization for national security as it now exists.

The organization established by the National Security Act can best be understood by a review of the problems which the act attempts to answer. The act may be viewed as a response to the weaknesses recognized in the country's efforts in World War II. Among the problems of waging modern war that were only partially solved in World War II three stand out: (1) the lack of correlation between foreign policy and military strength, or unpreparedness; (2) the gap between military risks and industrial mobilization, or the failure to recognize the importance of logistics in war;

and (3) the lack of coordination among the services, particularly in fields other than strategy, where, generally speaking, answers were found to the great problems of coordination.

These three problems of warfare are more acute in the present stage of rapid technological change than at the outbreak of World War II. Although the precise characteristics of such new weapons as the atomic bomb, the long-range plane, and the guided missile are unknown, their total effect is generally accepted—that if war comes it will come more rapidly and be more devastating than ever before. Allies are not available who are capable of containing an enemy for the two-year period required in previous wars to bring the weight of our factories to bear in the conflict. The traditional unpreparedness of this country might be fatal. The necessity is clear for close ties between foreign policy, intelligence and awareness of an enemy's intentions, and what Hanson Baldwin has called mobilization "readiness." A return to the pinch-penny military establishment of the 1930's seems unlikely in view of present policy. The current \$14 billion budget for the military establishment may be a bench mark for the years ahead. It is essential, therefore, that the three military departments be so coordinated that funds and manpower will not be wasted in unnecessary duplications in facilities and overhead. The organizational forms of the National Security Act must prove sufficiently flexible, yet sufficiently strong, to provide and execute the policies required in this period of great changes in the technics of warfare. Our national life may well depend upon a solution to the three problems listed above which is superior to the solutions of our adversaries.

NOTE: Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Office, Secretary of Defense.

The National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency

THE gap between foreign policy and military policy under the National Security Act may be bridged by the National Security Council. Pearl Harbor dramatized the existence of this gap better than any other event of the last war. In the age of the atomic bomb a surprise attack on industrial centers of population and the seat of government could be decisive.

The objective of the National Security Council is to relate military, foreign, and domestic policies by providing a forum to policy-makers. It is the council's duty "to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power. . . ." The membership of the National Security Council, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the chairman of the National Security Resources Board is of the top level that befits the status of the council as an advisory agency to the President. The President is the chairman of the council. The council formalizes a continuing relationship between those responsible for foreign and military policies, and this is of utmost importance when war if it comes may be expected to occur with little warning. The State Department initiates the preparation of most of the papers considered by the council.

The National Security Council is a policy-making and coordinating group, not an executive or operating body. It has an executive secretary who works in close liaison with one of the special assistants to the Secretary of Defense. It is generally supposed that far-reaching subjects—such as the return of Trieste to Italy and the undertaking of the air lift for the relief of Berlin—are on the National Security Council agenda. One publicized meeting of the council was on the occasion of General Clay's report from Berlin in July 1948; otherwise, little public information is available. That General Clay reported to the National Security Council instead of the Cabinet is suggestive of the important role this agency may occupy.

The Central Intelligence Agency is responsive to National Security Council guidance and

this relationship should be symbolic of the role of intelligence in the formulation of policy. The Central Intelligence Agency is the residuary legatee of the wartime functions of the Office of Strategic Services and the Central Intelligence Group, which had been established by Executive order. Fore-knowledge of an enemy's intentions is obtained less by cloak and dagger work than through the painstaking analysis of freely available information about the activities in the laboratories and factories of foreign nations. Naval, Air, and Army attaches continue to collect data for their departments and the reports coming in are channeled up to Central Intelligence. The Department of State also furnishes data. Central Intelligence, however, is intended as more than a clearing house or coordinating body. It has its own staff of civilian and military scientists, economic analysts, and statisticians who collect, analyze, and disseminate information. Representatives of the military departments serve on Central Intelligence Agency committees and reading panels. As an agency of the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency is not subordinate to the military establishment. Its director may be a military man or a civilian; the incumbent is a military man as was his predecessor. The vital importance to our defense of an effective intelligence system has been repeatedly emphasized. It is imperative that the Central Intelligence Agency function effectively.

The National Security Resources Board

THE second link in the chain of national security is the National Security Resources Board, a civilian agency within the framework of the President's immediate office, which is intended to close the gap between foreign and military policies and domestic policies in the economic resources area and in mobilization planning. The board is responsible for the coordination of domestic and economic policies and programs and is the planning agency cut to fit the cloth of total war. Its mission is "to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization" and to evaluate "the relationship between potential supplies of, and potential re-

quirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war."

One of the weaknesses of Hitler's war effort was its failure to support the civilian home front properly. To feed and clothe the soldier at the cost of weakening the civilian base is to fail in understanding total war. The framers of the National Security Act conceived the National Security Resources Board as the agency whose planning efforts would pull in the direction of a balanced war effort. This is not a duty which exists just if "M" Day comes. We have learned that nations may become engaged in undeclared wars, and preparedness during a "cold" war may be just as vital as mobilization duties.

The National Security Resources Board, under a civilian chairman, is composed of the heads of such departments and agencies as the President may direct. At present the Secretaries of Defense, State, Treasury, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor are members of the board. The board's programs are related to those of the Munitions Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Research and Development Board through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The chairman of the National Security Resources Board is also a member of the National Security Council. Like the National Security Council, the board is advisory to the President.

The Resources Board has coming into it information on foreign policies, as well as intelligence data from the National Security Council and the requirements for executing the related strategic plans from the National Military Establishment. Foreign policies and domestic, social, and economic policies may thus be expected to influence one another and civilian and military requirements may be balanced with the capacity of the economy to furnish the manpower, materials, transportation, and power to meet them. The board receives advice, studies, and reports on resources and civilian requirements from the departments and agencies of the government, private agencies and research committees, and its advisory committees and consultants, as well as representatives of agriculture, industry, and labor. It learns of military requirements from

the Munitions Board. Examples of board studies to date are the stockpiling program; strategic relocation of industries and economic activities; capacities and requirements of electric power systems; heavy power equipment production; and power problems in the aluminum industry. The board is preparing draft emergency legislation for economic mobilization. As a result of its studies, the Board recommends policies and programs to the President for preparedness for war and mobilization in event of war. At present, the board is an advisory planning agency rather than a directive agency.

The staff of the National Security Resources Board consists of about 350 people. The chairman has reporting to him a general counsel, a secretariat, and a public information officer. The vice chairman, who is the executive officer of the organization, also reports to the chairman. The vice chairman has one staff arm for planning internal working programs, a director of plans and programs, and another staff arm, a director of mobilization, organization, and procedure, for the development of organization and procedures concerning relationships within the staff, the planning relationships with other agencies, and the wartime relationships within a possible economic command and between that economic command and other government agencies. Four mobilization planning working groups report to the vice chairman: production, transportation and storage, the utilization of human resources, and economic management including foreign economic warfare. These groups could become a nucleus of a possible war production board in event of an emergency. The National Security Resources Board inherited the responsibilities of the emergency war agencies to the extent that these have not been vested in the regular departments. In conjunction with the regular departments of the government, the board is expected to keep plans in skeleton form for those central organizations which would need to be rapidly expanded in event of mobilization. In its planning the board obtains the aid and assistance of industry, labor, agriculture, and the general public.

Agency Interrelationships

THE National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board are outside the Military Establishment and are advisory to the President; the War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board are within the Military Establishment. The coordinate departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force are the "operating" organizations of the Military Establishment. Military thinking thus may be expected to have a strong but not an exclusive influence on national policy. The Secretary of Defense has stated that policy-making is not the business of the military; rather, it is the military's business "to see to it that our military potential conforms to the requirements of our national policy." At the level of the Secretary of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff roughly corresponds to the National Security Council; the Munitions Board and Research and Development Board within their respective fields are roughly similar to the National Security Resources Board. In broad terms, the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the policy agency in strategy, the Munitions Board in supply, and the Research and Development Board in research. Through the Joint Chiefs military strategy is responsive to military risks; through the Munitions Board and Research and Development Board logistics planning is kept in balance with strategic planning and coordination may be brought about in materiel matters. The War Council is the over-all agency, roughly comparable to a board of directors for the military establishment. In addition to their responsibility to serve as the staff of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board are responsible for policy coordination and policy review between the departments.

Threads of relationship are being spun out between personnel of these agencies both within and outside the Military Establishment. The Munitions Board and the National Security Resources Board clear the establishment of industry advisory committees with one another. The service Chiefs of Staff meet

with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the three departments in the War Council, and the four Secretaries meet on policy matters other than strategy in the "Committee of Four." The Munitions Board, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Research and Development Board all advised the Secretary of Defense in the formulation of the supplemental appropriation for the budget of the Military Establishment for the fiscal year 1949 and are now advising him in connection with the preparation of an integrated military budget for the fiscal year 1950. The relationship between the National Security Resources Board and the Munitions Board in industrial mobilization planning and the relationship of the Munitions Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military requirements may succeed in tying civilian efforts to the strategic concept and the military conduct of a war. This was not accomplished during World War II. The fabric of interrelationships in planning and policy-making, therefore, is of great importance.

The War Council

THE War Council has been meeting regularly since the Secretary of Defense took his oath of office. It is composed of the Secretary of Defense, the civilian secretaries of the three departments, and their chiefs of staff. Many of the major problems considered by the Secretary of Defense have found their way to War Council agenda. One of the special assistants to the Secretary of Defense prepares the agenda for a meeting and it is circulated to members in advance in order to permit appropriate briefing. Frequently the service secretaries suggest topics that should be included. Subjects have ranged from questions of dress for the services to discussions of the military aspects of foreign policy. The intent has been to make this agency a forum for frank expressions of the opinions of the closest advisers of the Secretary of Defense with the "power of decision" remaining with the Secretary. It is quite possible that the War Council may become an effective "board of directors" in the main stream of policy formulation of the Military Establishment.

The Munitions Board

THE Office of the Secretary of Defense has endeavored to strengthen the organization of the Munitions Board, visualizing it as one of the Secretary's most important staff arms. The Munitions Board has responsibility for the coordination of procurement, production, and distribution and the military aspects of industrial mobilization. The services made improvements in coordination in these fields during the war, but they were severely criticized when failure to coordinate was observed. The board consists of the under secretary or assistant secretary of each department with departmental responsibility for procurement matters. Its chairman and deputy chairman are civilians. It is important to have representatives of the point of view of industry in these positions. Although the director of the Munitions Board staff and the heads of divisions are officers from the services, the board is staffed primarily with civilian specialists. At present the staff consists of approximately 275 civilians and 75 military officers.

A major board function is the formulation, review, and coordination of requirements and this function is divided among the material, manpower and utilities, facilities, and military requirements divisions. The military requirements division formulates uniform methods of presenting requirements. When the operational and logistical plans of the three departments come back to the Munitions Board, pursuant to the strategic concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the manpower and utilities division, materials division, and facilities division translate these plans into the ships, guns, planes, shoes, or rounds of ammunition needed. They estimate whether the nation has the means in raw materials, power, labor, and plants to meet the military requirements within the framework of total civilian-military requirements conceived by the National Security Resources Board. If the logistical and strategic pieces of the picture do not fit, the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be asked for revision of the strategic plans. This is the barest outline of the procedure; it suggests, however, the relationship among the Munitions Board, National Security Resources Board, Joint Chiefs

of Staff, and the departments in the requirements procedure.

The Munitions Board contributes to coordination between the departments through industrial mobilization planning, procedural planning and standardization, and the elimination of unnecessary duplications in the use of facilities and services. Interservice competition for plant facilities is being avoided and accurate knowledge of the productive ability of the United States is being obtained by means of the coordinated facilities allocation program of the Munitions Board. With the consent of plant management concerned, manufacturing capacity for production of specified items is being planned so as to make maximum use of productive capacity. Some 20,000 to 25,000 plants are intended to be included in this program. An example of coordination through procedural standardization is the publication recently of uniform armed service procurement regulations. This type of work is monitored by the board's procurement division. The division has work under way leading to the publication and use of uniform supply catalogue procedures for the three departments. The studies under way for elimination of duplications of facilities and services are varied and diverse. Among the many subjects being studied are duplications in the use of laundries, use of space in the San Francisco area, post exchanges and ship stores, housing facilities, procurement field offices, postal systems, and motion picture facilities. The board plans the stockpiling of critical materials. It also plans and administers the maintenance of a reserve of industrial plants built for World War II. It assigns armed service procurement responsibility. These examples are suggestive of the broad range of Munitions Board activities.

The method of operation of the Munitions Board is broadly similar to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Research and Development Board. It illustrates the strength and the problems connected with the present organization for national security. It is in large part through their committee structure that these agencies carry out their missions. The Munitions Board exercises leadership and direction, but achievements depend in large part upon

mutual cooperation by the services. The divisions of the Munitions Board request the establishment of committees and develop missions and membership in cooperation with the services. The tasks and objectives of committees are assigned in directives issued by division directors. The membership of a committee elects its chairman and he may appoint subcommittees at his discretion. Committees are generally under the staff supervision of one of the divisions of the Munitions Board, which appoints a liaison representative who facilitates committee work. Committee work in the eighty-odd Munitions Board committees is thus a joint responsibility of the departments and the board.

The strength of this setup lies in the fact that the services participate in the formulation of policy and this participation provides the Munitions Board a measure of control in its execution. The problem is, of course, that the service representatives assigned to the Munitions Board must be more than departmental protagonists; otherwise, effective balance and coordination in the use of resources for preparedness and mobilization will be difficult to obtain. The problem of obtaining loyalty to the objectives of unification over and above representation of the point of view of a particular service is common in more or less degree to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Research and Development Board, as well as to the Munitions Board. It is, in fact, one of the major organization problems arising out of the National Security Act.

The Research and Development Board

THE Research and Development Board has the mission of achieving coordination among the services in its functional field. It is composed of two representatives of each service under a civilian chairman and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense. The board is primarily a review rather than an operating agency; that is, it does not award contracts, construct research and development facilities, or operate laboratories. The board examines the research plans of the services with particular emphasis on gaps and overlaps. Through

its annual report the board is to submit its recommendations for what would be considered an ideal research program for the Military Establishment. The Secretary of Defense calls upon the Research and Development Board for budget advice in a number of situations. It advises the Secretary of Defense in setting an over-all figure for research and development which is a limiting factor on the research and development programs of the services. Within this over-all limitation the services submit estimates for specific projects which the committees of the Research and Development Board analyze and upon which the board bases its recommendations for shifts of emphasis. In case of revisions of figures downward by the Bureau of the Budget or by the Congress, the Research and Development Board makes recommendations for the absorption of the cuts. The board's work, therefore, goes beyond coordination to an evaluation of the research and development program of the Military Establishment to achieve balance. In making such broad recommendations the board must resolve differences of opinion of its various committees and relate its work to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the field of war planning. In view of the accelerated development of new weapons and uncertainties as to the time when each will be fully developed, this is one of the most delicate missions of the Military Establishment.

The Research and Development Board operates primarily through working committees. At the present time there are working committees on such subjects as aeronautics, electronics, geophysical sciences, guided missiles, ordnance, medical sciences, human resources, and petroleum. These working committees are usually headed by a scientist from industry or one of the universities and include representatives from the services. The committees derive their authority from charters issued by the Research and Development Board. There are approximately 250 civilian and military personnel working in the office of the deputy executive secretary, the programs division, and the planning division of the Research and Development Board. Most of their work is concerned with facilitating the projects of the various committees.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE Joint Chiefs of Staff preserves and strengthens the organization arrangement which was noteworthy during the war in achieving coordination in military planning and operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agency is composed of the Chief of Staff to the President, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations. They act as military advisers to the President as Commander in Chief and to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Staff is a "working" group limited by the National Security Act to one hundred officers who perform duties directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The functions and activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relate to strategy, intelligence, logistics, communications, troop training and education, meteorology, and military transportation. They include such problems as the composition, organization, and size of the forces to be mobilized, the strategic plans for the employment of military forces, and the logistics plans for their support. Under the National Security Act the agency has responsibility for "review of the major materiel and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans. . . ." The act also requires the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff has continuing committees and groups on strategic plans, logistics plans, and intelligence. The agency works through subcommittees of these groups and makes extensive use of staff papers. Typically a committee, group, or subcommittee is composed of three service representatives and a deputy director of the Joint Staff from a Joint Staff group with jurisdiction corresponding to that of the committee. Papers are usually worked up by the subcommittees of Joint Staff groups, reviewed by Joint Staff committees, and placed on the agenda for Joint Chiefs consideration. The work may consist of questions raised by the Joint Chiefs and referred to the committees or matter originated by the committees and submitted to the Joint Chiefs for approval. The power of decision is in the Joint Chiefs. On the basis of wartime experi-

ence, these institutional arrangements can achieve coordination in military matters.

It is true that the operating procedures followed by the Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff are not conducive to speed of decision because the information required for decisions is found to a considerable extent only within the departments. The Joint Staff has been referred to as a "giant paper mill." In a sense, however, the requirement of unanimity brings more deliberation to decisions, and the element of deliberation and considered judgment may be regarded as one of the strengths in the Joint Chief's setup. Decisions in cases of differences are primarily the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. It is significant that committee representatives usually have department duties; also, the officers on the Joint Staff return to their respective services after their tours of duty. Here, again, the problem of representation of the nation's interest as well as the service point of view is at the heart of policy formulation, but time will produce officers who are informed about services other than their own and who think in terms of interest larger than those of their own service.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agency is on the policy-planning level but the Joint Chiefs exercise control in theaters of operations through designation of commanders in theaters in which they have established unified commands. The commanders of these unified commands have jurisdiction over naval, air, and ground forces; they report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the war, the agency extended its scope from long-range planning of strictly military matters to current requirements of a logistical nature. In general, however, its studies were limited to specific problems, and overall coordination on a comprehensive basis was the exception rather than the rule. An over-all logistics plan was developed for the Pacific area but this comprehensive approach was not taken for other theaters. As it is now constituted in legislation, the Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff are responsible for achieving coordination on a continuing, rather than on a spotty, basis.

A chief concern of the Office of the Secretary of Defense has been to draft "terms of reference" which would build a system of working relations between top-level statutory

boards. In the Munitions Board directive issued June 9, 1948, the Secretary of Defense directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep the board currently informed on major materiel and personnel requirements. The Munitions Board was directed to make feasibility studies of industrial mobilization plans against the background of the strategic concept of the Joint Chiefs. In the Research and Development Board directive issued December 18, 1947, the Secretary of Defense directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the Research and Development Board with general guidance on strategic concepts. The Joint Chiefs were required to estimate the technical performance and military efficiency of major weapons systems under envisaged combat conditions and apprise the board of their strategic value. The board, in turn, is to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the effects of scientific advances and their interrelationships with strategy. The board also is to make recommendations to the departments on the priority of research projects on the basis of the relative importance of weapon systems as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The hope of great gains in military efficiency lies in strengthening the interrelationships of the agencies charged with broad functional responsibilities for strategy, procurement, production, distribution, and research and development at the policy-planning level. These agencies can secure a coordinated, integrated program among the departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force at the highest level. Whether the over-all direction of the Secretary of Defense through the "committee administration" of these agencies can overcome departmental differences in procedures and loyalties and eliminate duplications and work at cross-purposes is an open question. In forging these organizations great gains toward this goal have been made.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense

THE National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Resources Board, the War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board are the links in the national security chain. Short of

the Presidency, they are related largely through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. When he became Secretary, Mr. Forrestal announced his intention of using the Joint Chiefs, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board as his primary staff, keeping the staff of his immediate office small so as to avoid a layer of organizations between him and the departments and statutory agencies. One of the Secretary's three special assistants is concerned with buckling together through secretariat functions the organizations that are links in the chain; another special assistant is concerned primarily with matters of business management; a third devotes his attention to legal matters. Small staff groups were established in an office of budget policy, an office of organizational policy, an office of general counsel, and an office of accounting policy. After six months of experience, the office of organizational policy was dropped and offices of progress reports, civil defense planning, and public information were added. A personnel policy board is being established to coordinate military and civilian personnel administration of the departments.

The problem of the authority of this immediate staff of the Secretary of Defense with respect to the statutory boards and the departments is as yet unsolved. The Secretary's immediate staff should be an embodiment of his program. In the event that the purposes and programs of the three great departments with their own Secretaries and identities pull away from the over-all policies of the Military Establishment, a strong staff in the office of the Secretary would be able to exert a pull in the direction of the over-all policies. In time their influence over the departments and statutory agencies, particularly the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board, might furnish the direction required to tie together this confederation of agencies and departments. It is mostly through this staff that civilian influence may be brought to bear on military policy.

The present organization for national security is capable of providing a policy appropriate to the role of the United States in world affairs. The top organization of the military establishment provides the means for balancing various interests and bringing to bear a

variety of judgments and points of view on the great decisions which must be made. To use Mr. Forrestal's words in a different context, this organization can provide the "capacity to make war." In an uncertain period of history where the risks are great and the margin for error small, the top structure is conducive to flexibility. It makes more possible than heretofore the development of a civilian-military team in the conduct of affairs. On the other hand, it sacrifices speed (which sometimes means arbitrariness) of decision and makes for some duplication. In retaining departmental identity and assigning missions to each department the National Security Act places emphasis on the goals of balance and flexibility in organization. In the light of the many unknown elements of warfare, these are wise goals. From them it follows that the Joint Chiefs of Staff setup may be more desirable than the single Chief of Staff advocated by many; the direction of the Secretary of Defense working with the departmental Secretaries may be more desirable than the subordination of departmental under secretaries to him.

In his policies and programs the Secretary of Defense must compensate for the organizational goals sacrificed. The advantages of coordination and teamwork must be formulated and accepted as overriding purposes offsetting the time required to reach decisions through the network of boards and committees. Through his budget staff and otherwise, the Secretary must execute an aggressive program to stand-

ardize procedures, fully utilize facilities and manpower, and eliminate "empire building." The myth of the unlimited resources of the United States is fairly well exploded and nothing in the organization philosophy of the National Security Act requires waste of resources, although the questions of duplications are not, contrary to popular opinion, simple and clear cut in specific instances.

It would be a mistake to let the difficulties of the first year of "unification" cause premature change in the basic organization for national security. An under secretary of defense and a statutory agency to coordinate civilian and military personnel policies between the departments might well be authorized. Perhaps the Secretary of Defense should have a part in the appointment and removal of top departmental officials. On the whole, however, the present structure fits the facts of the situation. Organizational forms are no substitute for men of character and competence in positions of responsibility and the job of building a team at the top is only beginning. In the words of the Secretary of Defense: "We are engaged in a great transitional process, namely to weld these components of sea, air and land power into an efficient unity the expenditures of which will be within the limits of our national economy to support. I would be less than candid with you if I did not say there is still a long way to go in achieving the perfection implied in phrase, but it can and will be done because it must be done."